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PFIZER, INC. v. INDIA
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS' STANDING TO
SUE FOR TREBLE DAMAGES
The concept of free enterprise in our economy is predicated
upon the idea that the competition therein be free and fair.' In
the late 1800's, however, business practices in the United States
had developed to the point where "the individual entrepreneur
and the small partnership were steadily replaced by the corporation, the trust, and the cartel as the customary forms of business organization. ' 2 These larger business organizations were
able to drive smaller businessmen out of business while denying
other small businessmen the opportunity to compete. 3 In response to this abuse of power by large corporations in denying
small businessmen a chance to compete equally, federal antitrust legislation was enacted.
The first attempt by the federal government to solve this
problem of unfair conduct was the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which was passed in 1890. 4 The language of its two substantive
sections 5 reflected a basic policy against concentration of wealth
to such an extent that this wealth could be used to suppress
competition. The Sherman Act did not, however, effectively resolve this problem. In many cases, the courts refused to find
certain conduct to be in violation of the law. There were also
certain anticompetitive practices that were not covered by the
1. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955) (entering into contracts with independent service stations for exclusive sales of auto accessories, and excluding any other brands, stated a
cause of action for violation of antitrust laws).
2. E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRUST PRIMER 3
(1974).

3. See id.

4. This law was passed with the assumption that the public interest lay
in maintaining a competitive economy in which corporate self-interest
would not be able to control the ability of the small businessman to compete. The intent was to control the sometimes outrageous anticompetitive
activities occuring then. Id. at 4.

5. The two substantive sections were sections one and two. Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1,2, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1,2 (1976)).
Section 1 read in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. at § 1.
Section 2 read in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt

to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons, to mo-

nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ... " Id. at
§ 2.
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Act. 6 As a result, there was a public uproar to enact more effective antitrust legislation. Public dissatisfaction against economic abuses increased to the point where the 1912 National
Platform of the Democratic Party adopted a statement favoring
the enactment of legislation that would strengthen the Sherman
Act.7 Finally, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914 which
was designed to strengthen the Sherman Act and to make antitrust legislation more effective.
One means of increasing the effectiveness of antitrust legislation was to allow private parties to sue for antitrust violations.
8
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits any person whose business or property has been injured as a result of an antitrust vio9
lation to sue for threefold the amount of actual damages. This
treble damage provision serves both as an incentive for private
10
This provision
individuals to sue, and as a punitive sanction.
was intended to aid in achieving the broad social objective of the
antitrust laws, which is to ensure fair competition."
The question, however, arose as to just how broadly the
term "any person" in section 4 should be construed. The
Supreme Court had held that the United States was not a person under section 4 and consequently, had no standing to sue for
6. See Levy, The Clayton Law--An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. L. REv. 411 (1916).
7. Id. at 415 (quoting the National Platform of the Democratic Party).
8. Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines person. Clayton Act of 1914, § 1,
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976). It reads in pertinent part:
The word "person" or "persons" wherever used in this Act shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the
territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
Id.
9. Clayton Act of 1914, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act superseded Section 7 of the Sherman Act
which contained similar language. Section 7 of the Sherman Act applied
only to the Sherman Act, while the Clayton Act covers violations of all federal antitrust laws. Section 7 was repealed in 1955 as redundant. 15
U.S.C.A. § 15, (Historical Note at 161) (1973).
10. See Parker, The DeterrentEffect ofPrivate Treble Damage Suits: Fact
or Fantasy,3 N.M. L. REv. 286 (1973). The author concluded that criminal
sanctions are very weak deterrents and that the treble damage provision
"thus becomes extremely important in determining the effectiveness of existing 'punitive' antitrust sanctions and the dimensions of the existing incentive for private enforcement." Id. at 287.
11. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d at 365.
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treble damages. 12 In contrast, the Supreme Court held that domestic states 13 and municipalities 14 were persons under section
4. Furthermore, the express language of the statute provided for
foreign corporations to be considered as persons under section
4.15 The question as to whether the term "any person" should
be construed so broadly as to permit foreign nations to sue for
treble damages arose in Pfizer, Inc. v. India.16 In Justice Stewart's majority opinion the Supreme Court ruled that the term
"any person" did confer standing to sue for treble damages for
antitrust violations under the Clayton Act upon a foreign sovereign.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation, as well as approximately one hundred and
fifty other actions, grew out of two events. One was a Federal
Trade Commission proceeding instituted in 1958 against Pfizer
17
and other drug companies to investigate their pricing policies.
The other was a criminal antitrust action brought by the United
States in 1961 against the drug companies for conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade. 18 Plaintiffs, the governments of
several foreign countries, 19 charged that defendants, six major
pharmaceutical firms, 20 had conspired to defraud the United
States Patent Office, to eliminate competition, and to fix antibiotic drug prices in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 21 Those sections provide that contracts in restraint of
12. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
13. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
14. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).

15. See note 8 supra.
16. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).

17. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 533 n.1, (8th Cir. 1972).
18. United States v. Chas. Pfizer &Co., Inc., 61 Cr. 772, rev'd for new trial,
426 F.2d 32 (2nd Cir. 1970), prior en banc hearing order vacated, opinion of
panel modified, and petition for rehearing denied 437 F. 2d 957 (2nd Cir.
1970), new trial determination afd,

404 U.S. 548 (1972).

The criminal antitrust litigation ended without a finding of guilt. The
Second Circuit reversed the criminal convictions and the Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal. United States v. Pfizer, Inc., 404 U.S.

548 (1972).
19. The foreign countries were the Government of India, the Imperial
Government of Iran, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Republic of
Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam's complaint was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the United States no longer recognized the

government of Vietnam and this dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977).
20. The six major pharmaceutical firms were Pfizer, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Bristol-Myers Company, Squibb Corporation, Olin Corporation, and The Upjohn Corporation. Id. at 892.
21. The actions were brought separately in federal district courts and
were later consolidated for pretrial purposes in the United States District

190

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:187

trade and persons restraining trade or attempting to restrain
trade are in violation of the federal antitrust laws.22 Claiming
that, as purchasers of antibiotics, they had been injured in their
business or property interests by the alleged antitrust violations, these countries sued for treble damages under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.
The drug companies asserted as an affirmative defense that
plaintiffs, as foreign nations, were not persons within the meaning of the statute. In response to pretrial motions, the district
court held that foreign nations were persons within the meaning
of the statute and declined to dismiss the actions for lack of
standing. 23 In reaching this decision, the district court relied on
its prior decision denying a motion to dismiss a related suit by
Kuwait. 24 In that case, the district court held that a foreign government was a person within the meaning of the statute. 25 The
court then recognized that this difficult question of statutory interpretation was one of first impression and certified the ques26
tion for appeal.
The appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit 27 which affirmed that foreign sovereigns were persons
within the meaning of the statute. The appellate court noted
that the case turned on statutory interpretation and nothing
more. 28 In interpreting the statute, the Eighth Circuit relied on
two previous Supreme Court cases dealing with the problem of
Court for the District of Minnesota. India and Iran alleged that they were
foreign states who maintained diplomatic relations and the Philippines alleged that it was a sovereign and independent government. See Pfizer, Inc.
v. India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 964 (1977); Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
23. India v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 75-48 (D. Minn. 1975) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss the suits by India and Iran). See cases cited in note
21 infra.
24. India v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 75-48 (D. Minn. 1975).
25. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In this decision the court pointed out that the important thing to keep in
mind was the result orientationwith which the Supreme Court has always
approached the area of private treble damage litigation. To make the antitrust laws as effective as possible, foreign governments must be allowed to
sue. The court reasoned that not enabling foreign nations to sue would
have an adverse effect on domestic competition. It would enable the domestic manufacturers to amass a substantial "war chest" from excessive
profits abroad with which they could fight domestic antitrust litigation. It
could also prevent either a domestic or foreign manufacturer from entering
a foreign market with the intent to become powerful enough to enter the
domestic market. The court concluded that for these reasons the fundamental goals of the antitrust laws would be seriously impaired if foreign nations
were not allowed to sue.
26. India v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 75-48 (D. Minn. 1975).
27. 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 397.
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whether sovereigns were persons under section 4 of the Clayton
29
Act.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Cooper Corp.,30
the United States was considered not to be a person under the
statute. The second decision, Georgia v. Evans,3 1 held that a
state was a person under the statute. In the appellate court's
opinion, a foreign nation was held to be analogous to a state
rather than the United States government. On that basis, the
appellate court held that sovereigns were persons under the
32
statute.
On a rehearing en banc the court of appeals reaffirmed, but
noted that there was no controlling legislative history.3 3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari stating that foreign sovereigns' standing to sue was an important and novel question in
34
administering antitrust laws.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district
court and the court of appeals. The Court also conceded that
this was a case of statutory interpretation and that there was no
35
Congressional intent to guide the Court in its interpretation.
The Pfizer Court, therefore, looked beyond what was explicitly
stated in the statute in determining its meaning. In determining the statute's meaning, the Court relied on the purposes and
policies of antitrust law to interpret the breadth of the statute.
The Court decided that the policies involved in antitrust legislation, the concepts of statutory interpretation, and the interests
of comity required that foreign nations be considered as persons
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Therefore,
foreign governments may sue for treble damages for injury to
their business or property caused by a violation of United States
36
antitrust laws.
29. Id. at 398.
30. 312 U.S. 600 (1971).
31. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
32. 550 F.2d at 399.
33. 550 F.2d at 400. In addition to noting the absence of controlling legislative history, the majority opinion expressed the view that Congress
should take some action. At present, there is a bill in the Senate which
would limit foreign nations to actual damages. See text accompanying
notes 135-139 infra.

34. 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
35. 434 U.S. at 313.
36. Respondents also sued in a parens patriae capacity but that claim
was dismissed in a separate appeal and the Supreme Court did not consider
the issue. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 615-20.
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Expansive Remedial Purpose

In its decision, the Supreme Court noted the expansive remedial purpose and the broad interpretation previously given
the antitrust laws.3 7 The breadth of the interpretation was determined by looking at the legislative and judicial history of
these laws.38 In analyzing the legislative history of the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court looked to the Senate debates concerning the Sherman Act and determined that these debates war'3 9
ranted a very broad interpretation of the phrase "any person.
In each debate during the drafting of the Sherman Act, concern was evinced that every American consumer should be protected to the fullest possible extent. Senator Sherman, the
sponsor of the bill, wanted every person, no matter how humble,
powerless and solitary, to be given an equal chance to compete. 4°
It was essential that "any party" 41 who had been
wronged should have a cause of action. 42 The use of the phrase
"any party" indicated that Senator Sherman felt that the bill
had to be drafted in such a way that any citizen would be able to
bring an action to protect himself. This concern further manifested itself in Sherman's dissatisfaction with the fact that the
bill, at the time these preliminary debates occurred, provided
only for double the damages incurred. Senator Sherman felt
that this amount was too small and that it would not be a sufficient incentive to encourage a person to sue for redress of a violation.43 The Sherman Act was passed to relieve the personal
37. 434 U.S. 312.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 312-13.
40. I do not care how much men combine for proper objects; but when
they combine with a purpose to prevent competition, so that if a humble man starts a business in opposition to them, solitary and alone, in
Ohio or anywhere else, they will crowd him down and they will sell
their product at a loss and give it away in order to prevent competition
* . . then it is the duty of the courts to intervene and prevent it by injunction and by the ordinary remedial rights afforded by the courts.
21 CONG. REc. 2569 (1890) (Remarks of Senator Sherman).
41. Id.
42. This debate was concerned with the constitutionality of the bill as it
was then written. By itself, it does not show that foreign sovereigns should
be allowed to sue, as pointed out by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent. 434
U.S. at 321-22. But this debate was not cited by the Supreme Court as direct evidence to show that there was Congressional intent to permit foreign
sovereigns to sue. It was cited merely to show how broad the remedial purpose of the statute was meant to be. See 434 U.S. at 312-13.
43. I think myself the rule of damages is too small. It provides
double the damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. Very few actions
will probably be brought, but the cases that will be brought will be by
men of spirit who will contest against these combinations.
21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890) (Remarks of Senator Sherman).
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disadvantages and hardships of the "workingmen all over our
land ... the farmers in their alliances"' 4 and all the other "common men" who suffered from the domination of competition by
large corporations.
Statutes enacted to relieve hardship and suffering are generally accorded a liberal construction. 45 Since the Sherman Act
was enacted for this purpose, it should be given a liberal construction. The Clayton Act, intended to strengthen and supplement the Sherman Act, also should be given a liberal
construction.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act is not the only
factor militating in favor of a broad interpretation of the antitrust laws. The judicial history of the antitrust laws also shows
that the courts have given the laws broad scope. The Supreme
Court has held that the Sherman Act was designed to be comprehensive in its terms, coverage, and protection of any victims
of prohibited practices. 46 Since the Clayton Act was enacted to
strengthen the Sherman Act, 47 the same logic applies to the
Clayton Act, afortiori,with regard to judicial interpretation.
Policy Behind Section 4 of the Clayton Act
The legislative history and the judicial history of the Sherman Act demonstrate that the purpose of the antitrust laws
warrants a liberal construction so as to protect American consumers from injuries resulting from violations of these laws. As
a means of providing such extensive protection, section 4 of the
Clayton Act allows private parties to bring actions for treble
damages.
Section 4 has two purposes: deterrence of antitrust violators
and compensation for victims of these violations.4 8 Potential litigants are offered the possibility of recovering treble damages in
order to maximize the incentive to sue and thus aid in antitrust
44. 21 CONG. REC. 2567 (1890) (Remarks of Senator Sherman).
45. "Statutes which are enacted to relieve personal disadvantage, hardship, and suffering are generally accorded generous judicial acceptance and

liberal construction." 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 58.04 (4th ed. 1972).
46. 'The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
47. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
48. But § 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators and
depriving them of the "fruits of their illegality," Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S.
at 494; it is also designed to compensate victims of antitrust violations
for their injuries.

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
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law enforcement. In effect, Congress is encouraging litigants to
serve as private attorney generals. 49 Thus, the treble damage
provision is an important law enforcement tool. The importance of an effective treble damage provision is apparent in that
it has been the most effective means of enforcing the antitrust
laws.50 Therefore, since the treble damage provision is an important method of enforcing antitrust laws, it has been broadly
51
construed by the Supreme Court.
Application to Foreign Plaintiffs
Having emphasized the importance of the policies behind
section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court decided that the
antitrust laws were applicable to foreign trade. 52 The Court
noted it was clear that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were not
intended to be restricted to American consumers since the definition of person under the Clayton Act expressly included foreign corporations. 53 Furthermore, the antitrust laws applied to
trade with foreign countries 54 both with regard to imports and
exports.5 5 For example, the Sherman Act had been held to apply to agreements made among United States companies work49. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (since a state
could sue for treble damages in its proprietary capacity, it could not recover
damages for injury to its general economy).
50. See Parker, The DeterrentEffect of Private Treble DamageSuits: Fact
or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286 (1973); Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign
Nations, 25 CATm. U.L. REV. 1, 5 n.28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Velvell.
51. Just how broadly the treble damage provision has been construed
may be illustrated by two cases. In Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the Supreme Court refused to recognize the doctrine of pari delicto as a defense to treble damage actions. The
Court stated that it would be inappropriate to invoke broad common law
barriers to relief where a private suit serves such an important public purpose. Although the plaintiff receiving the reward may be no less morally
reprehensible than the defendant, he is allowed to sue in order to further
the overriding public policy in favor of competition. Id. at 139.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), the Court refused to allow a defense of "passing-on" to vindicate
defendant. Defendant had argued that since plaintiff had "passed-on" the
higher costs to his customers the plaintiff had suffered no injury and therefore should not be allowed to sue. The Court, in rejecting the argument,
stated that it was still possible for plaintiff to be injured. More importantly,
the Court stated that if it recognized this defense, then treble damage actions would be substantially reduced in effectiveness. Therefore, the Court
was not willing to accept this defense, noting how important treble damage
actions were to antitrust enforcement. Id. at 494.
52. 434 U.S. at 313-15.
53. 434 U.S. at 313.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
55. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE

U.S.A. 343 (2d ed. 1970).
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ing together in foreign markets.56 It had also been held to apply
to agreements between United States
and foreign companies
57
working together in foreign markets.
The Supreme Court in Pfizer found additional evidence that
the antitrust laws were not meant to be applicable only to American consumers in the legislative and judicial history of the
Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918,58 passed four years

after the Clayton Act. The Webb-Pomerene Act qualified the operation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the field of foreign
trade by exempting certain agreements that American exporters
had entered into regarding foreign commerce that would otherwise violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 59 These agreements, however, must not have a restrictive effect on commerce,
or be exclusionary, or harmful60against American exporters who
do not join in the agreements.
Before the Webb-Pomerene Act was passed, there was a
thorough investigation of foreign trade by the Federal Trade
Commission. The entire emphasis of its report was the desirability of furthering competition between domestic and foreign
concerns and not the elimination of competition. 61 This report
was presented to Congress, and contributed to the drafting, debating, and passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act. 62

Statements

by the sponsors of the Webb-Pomerene Act demonstrated that
they thought the Act would strengthen the Sherman Act, 63 because it extended the antitrust laws beyond the boundaries of
the United States." Thus, the clear intent of Congress was to
apply the antitrust laws beyond American consumers.
The scope of this exemption to the Sherman Act was narrowly construed by the judiciary. 65 A New York federal district
56. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950).

57. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
58. Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, §§ 1-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65
(1976).

59. Id. at § 62.
60. A.

NEALE, THE ANTITRUST

LAWS

OF THE

U.S.A. 343 (2d ed. 1970).

61. United States v. United States Alkali Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 68-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (an export association violated the Sherman Act by entering into agreements with foreign companies relating to divisions of world
markets, assignment of international quotas and fixing of prices).
62. Id. at 69.
63. "It strengthens the Sherman law ... in so far as unfair practices are
concerned beyond territorial lines." 56 CoNG. REC. 173 (1917) (Remarks of
Senator Pomerene).
64. United States v. United States Alkali Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. at 67.
65. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.. 593

(1951) (the Webb-Pomerene Act does not apply where United States companies and foreign companies agree to divide up a foreign market to limit
competition); United States v. Minnesota Mining &Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947
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court held that instead of restricting the application of the antitrust laws abroad, the Webb-Pomerene Act in fact extended the
extraterritorial effect of those laws. 66 The Webb-Pomerene Act

also enlarged the investigatory powers of the Federal Trade
Commission to extraterritorial agreements. 67 Therefore, the
Webb-Pomerene Act was evidence that the antitrust laws
should apply to trade with foreign countries as well as domestic
68
citizens.
The Supreme Court noted that if the antitrust laws did not
apply to a foreign plaintiff, such a plaintiff would be without a
remedy and the purposes of section 4, deterrence and compensation, would be defeated. 69 Such antitrust violators would not
be liable for violations committed against foreign consumers,
thereby significantly diminishing the deterrent value of the
treble damages action. The deterrent value would be diminished because it would no longer be available for extraterritorial
violations. Since the deterrent value would decline and victims
of the violations would go uncompensated, both purposes of section 4 would be frustrated.
The resultant decreased effectiveness of the antitrust laws
would not be the only drawback. The Pfizer Court noted that
the inability of foreign customers to be compensated for injuries
caused by antitrust violators could adversely affect American
consumers. 70 For example, if several American companies possessing significant monopoly power conspired to fix prices
worldwide, then higher prices could result in the United
States. 71 More importantly, the inability of foreign plaintiffs to
sue could lessen their confidence that they would receive fair
(D. Mass. 1950) (the Webb-Pomerene Act does not apply where United
States companies agree to enter upon combined operations in foreign markets which have the effect of restricting imports).
66. "Far from restricting the application of the antitrust laws abroad,
the Webb Act made what, at the time of its passage, were wide extensions
in the extraterritorial effect of those laws designed to preserve competition." United States v. United States Alkali Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 67
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
67. Webb-Pomerene Act, §§ 4,5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 64,65 (1976).
68. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissent (Rehnquist and Powell, JJ.,
joining) in Pfizer where he stated that the Webb-Pomerene Act indicated
that Congress felt that American consumers' interests could be served at
the expense of foreign states and consumers. 434 U.S. at 323.
69. 'To deny a foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation would
defeat these purposes." 434 U.S. at 314.

70. 434 U.S. at 315.
71. 'This result occurs because a worldwide conspiracy, so long as it
remains effective, eliminates the possibility that foreign suppliers may seek
to enter the American market with competitive prices that are beneath the
existing domestic price level." Velvel, supra note 50, at 8. See also In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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treatment under American law. This might lead to a reluctance
by foreign consumers to invest or purchase in the United
72
States.
The Supreme Court was also cognizant of the fact that the
loss of the deterrent factor inherent in the treble damage action
73
Immucould also result in harm to the American consumer.
nity from treble damage actions by foreign plaintiffs would enable domestic manufacturers to compile substantial "war
chests" from excess foreign profits.7 4 These "war chests" could
then be used to establish and maintain domestic conspiracies
75
and to defend them from potential antitrust actions. Alternatively, if antitrust violators were to be held accountable for their
conduct with foreign customers, then American consumers
to the maximizing of the deterrent effect of
would benefit due
76
treble damages.
The inability of foreign plaintiffs to sue would be detrimental not only to foreign plaintiffs but also to American consumers.
Therefore, in order to protect American consumers, foreign
plaintiffs should be allowed to sue for treble damages.
Application to Foreign Sovereigns
Although the Supreme Court felt that foreign plaintiffs, individual or corporate, had standing to sue, this did not necessarily
imply that foreign sovereigns should be allowed to sue for treble
damages. 7 7 There are differences between corporations and
sovereigns. First, it is possible for corporations to possess
rights which are denied to sovereigns.7 8 Second, foreign corposovrations are subject to suit in the United States while foreign
79
immunity.
sovereign
accorded
generally
ereigns are
72. Velvel, supra note 50, at 8 n.40. Alternatively, if foreign purchasers
feel confident of fair treatment under American law, then they will be encouraged to invest capital and make purchases in the United States.

73. 434 U.S. at 315.
74. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
75. Velvel, supra note 50, at 8.
76. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Pfizer. Burger argued that

the treble damage provisions were designed primarily as a remedy and not
as a deterrent. The Court did not have the power to give a remedy to some-

one not intended by Congress to receive the remedy. To do so would be to
reverse the priorities solely on the basis of some possible beneficial consequences to American consumers deriving from this "maximum deterrent."
434 U.S. at 329.
77. 434 U.S. at 315.
78. See, e.g., Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524
(C.C.P.A. 1934) (a corporation was allowed to sue although owned by a sovereign whom the United States did not recognize).

79. In dealing with sovereign immunity the Court has distinguished be-
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The main question before the Supreme Court in Pfizer was
whether the word "person" in the Clayton Act included sovereigns.8 0 In order to answer this question, the Pfizer Court examined two prior decisions that had dealt with whether a
sovereign was a person within the meaning of the antitrust laws.
In the first decision, United States v. Cooper Corp.,81 the
Court faced the issue of whether the United States could maintain an action under section 7 of the Sherman Act, which permitted treble damages. Since section 7 of the Sherman Act was
replaced by section 4 of the Clayton Act, the logic in Cooper was
applicable to Pfizer.8 2 In Cooper,the Court maintained that the
Sherman Act created new rights and remedies which were avail83
But in deciding who was
able only to those named in the Act.
automatically exclude a
to
declined
Court
the
Act,
the
named in
of the Act or by other
construction
strict
a
by
sovereign either
4
Court felt that the
The
construction.
of
canons
traditional
and if doubt resense
natural
its
in
statute should be read
be resolved by
should
doubt
such
then
mained as to its meaning,
85
the Cooper
criteria
these
other means of interpretation. Under
within the
person
a
not
Court held that the United States was
86
Act.
Sherman
the
of
meaning
tween situations in which the foreign sovereign was exercising its sovereign
powers and situations in which it was acting in a commercial capacity. In
the former situation sovereign immunity was held applicable while in the
latter situation it wasn't. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976) (a sovereign's refusal to repay accounts receivable mistakenly
paid was not. an act of state, but merely a commercial transaction and,
therefore, sovereign immunity was not a valid defense).
80. The word person did not have a fixed meaning. In section 1 of the
Clayton Act, person is defined as including various categories. However,
the terms means and includes are not synonymous and categories not mentioned are not to be automatically excluded. Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293
U.S. 121, 125 (1934). Therefore, sovereigns were not automatically excluded
from the Act simply because they were not included in the categories mentioned. In dealing with the standing of sovereigns, "there is no hard and
fast rule of exclusion." United States v. Cooper Corp. 312 U.S. 600, 605
(1941).
81. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
82. See note 9 supra.
83. 312 U.S. at 604. Note that this statement gives rise to an argument
that the statute should be construed strictly. The Sherman Act modified
the common law with regard to actions in restraint of competition. The
general rule is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
58.03 (4th ed. 1972). The Court rejected a narrow interpretation in Pfizer,
however, saying that the expansive remedial scope of the Act did not permit
such a construction. 434 U.S. at 313.
84. 312 U.S. at 605.
85. Id. These other aids to construction are purpose, subject matter,
context, legislative history and executive interpretation of the statute.
86. Id. at 614.
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The basis of the decision in Cooper was that the United
States government had alternative antitrust weapons with
which to prosecute violators. The federal government could
bring criminal prosecutions,8 7 suits in equity,88 and seize property89 to enforce the antitrust laws. 9° Therefore, the Court drew
a distinction between means of enforcement available to the
federal government and treble damage actions available to private parties. The Court held that because it had available alternative remedies, the United States was not intended to be a
person under the statute. 9 '
In the second decision, Georgia v. Evans, 92 the Supreme
Court decided that a state was a person within the statute. Unlike the federal government, a state cannot prosecute violations
of the Sherman Act. 93 The Court could perceive no reason why
Congress would want to deprive a state of any way to protect its
interests under federal law. Therefore, since a state, unlike the
federal government, has no other federal antitrust weapons
available to it, it should be permitted to invoke the same civil
remedy of treble damages as any other injured purchaser. 94 After examining the previous decisions involving similar questions
of interpretation of antitrust laws, the Pfizer Court faced the
question of whether Cooper or Evans should control.
At first glance it would seem that a foreign sovereign is more
analogous to the federal government than to a state. Just as the
federal government has alternative procedures for combatting
antitrust violations, foreign sovereigns have alternative means
of protecting themselves. 95 Upon a deeper inquiry, though, this
analogy breaks down.
87. Sherman Act §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
88. Id. § 4.
89. Id. § 6.
90. In 1955, section 4a of the Clayton Act was enacted giving the United
States the right to sue for actual damages when damaged in its business or
property by a violation of the antitrust laws. Clayton Act § 4a, 15 U.S.C. §
15(a) (1976) (original version at ch. 283, §1, 69 Stat. (1955)).
91. 312 U.S. at 608. In addition, the Court found evidence in the Congressional Record that the United States government was not intended to
be included as a person. Id. at 611.
92. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).

93. Id. at 162.
94. We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to
deprive a State, as purchaser of commodities shipped in interstate commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages which is available to other
purchasers who suffer through violation of the Act.
316 U.S. at 162.
95. Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private Federal Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNELL INT. L.J. 137, 142 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Foreign Sovereigns Antitrust Actions]. These means might include

passing their own antitrust laws or using other controls over its commerce,
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The United States government has a pre-existing duty to
pursue antitrust violators, regardless of whether it has been directly injured or not.96 Foreign sovereigns have no such duty.

As it is difficult for the United States to discover antitrust violations, it is even more difficult for a foreign sovereign to discover
such. Foreign sovereigns cannot invoke a grand jury, initiate a
prosecution, or seize assets in the United States. 97 While the
United States has other incentives to sue for antitrust relief, a
foreign sovereign's sole incentive is a monetary reward. 98 As a
result, therefore, a foreign sovereign cannot accurately be compared to the United States government. On these grounds, the
Cooper rationale is not applicable.
If Cooper does not apply, the question arises whether Evans
applies. An analogy may be made between a state and a foreign
sovereign. As stated in Evans, without the ability to sue for
treble damages, states would be without a remedy under the
federal antitrust laws for injuries sustained by them. 99 Similarly, if foreign sovereigns were not allowed to sue, they would
also be without any effective remedy under the United States
antitrust laws. 0 0
This analogy, however, is not totally accurate. The decision
in Evans is based upon the fact that the inability of a state to
sue for treble damages would deny the state "any redress for
injuries resulting from practices outlawed by that Act."''1 1
While foreign states might be left without any effective remedy
under the antitrust laws if they are unable to sue, they still
would have other means of obtaining redress. 10 2 For example,
foreign governments could retaliate by forming cartels with regard to natural resources. 10 3 They could also enact their own antitrust laws and bring criminal or civil actions in their own
such as pricing and import, export and tariff regulations. See text accompanying notes 102-105 infra.
96. Foreign Sovereigns Antitrust Actions, supra note 95, at 143.
97. Velvel, supra note 50, at 21.
98. Foreign Sovereigns Antitrust Actions, supra note 95, at 143.

99. 316 U.S. at 162.
100. See Velvel, supra note 50, at 21; Foreign Sovereigns Antitrust Actions, supra note 95, at 143 n.32.
101. 316 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added).
102. In fact, the Supreme Court recognized the fact that foreign sovereigns have alternate modes of action. The Court argued that unless foreign
sovereigns were allowed to sue, the actions the sovereigns might take in
return would affect American consumers. See text accompanying notes 71-

72 supra.
103. See Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying
Cooperation,84 YALE L.J. 268, 276 (1974). Such cartels have already been
formed for oil and copper. Id. at 269 n.6.
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courts. 10 4 Furthermore, they could seize goods located within
their countries, increase tariff barriers, withdraw licenses to do
business, or refuse to recognize patents. 0 5 Therefore, if the key
to Evans was that states had no recourse to violations, this same
logic is not entirely applicable to foreign sovereigns.
Alternatively, commentators have argued that since both
states and sovereigns lack a primary duty to enforce the antitrust laws, they are analogous. 0 6 However, there is nothing in
Evans to imply that it was the lack of primary duty to enforce
the antitrust laws that permitted states to sue for treble damages. The emphasis in Evans is placed on lack of remedy, not
10 7
on the lack of a primary duty.
Despite the fact that foreign sovereigns are not totally devoid of remedies, Evans is an applicable precedent. Many
states do have their own antitrust acts, and hence are not totally
lacking in remedies as the Evans Court implied. 0 8 These acts
allow states to bring their own actions for violations affecting
business within their state. 0 9 Thus, states do have some recourse, even though without the ability to sue for treble damages they would have no remedy under federal antitrust laws.
This strengthens the analogy to foreign sovereigns, since many
foreign sovereigns have their own antitrust laws. 110
There also are practical considerations involved that might
put a foreign sovereign in an unenviable situation in prosecuting
antitrust violations under United States law. Political remedies
such as cartels or boycotts are hardly available to a foreign nation faced with monopolistic control over supplies of medicine
These
needed for the health and safety of its people.1'1
problems leave a foreign government in a position which is no
better and possibly worse, than a state in obtaining remedies for
104. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Pfizer, noted that several foreign countries have their own antitrust laws, including respondents India

and the Philippines. 434 U.S. at 327.
105. Velvel, supra note 50, at 11.
106. Note, The Capacity of a Foreign Government to Bring an Action for
Treble Damages Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

287, 291 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as Foreign Government Antitrust

Standing].

107. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 162.
108. Velvel, supra note 50, at 21 n.83.
109. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to 60-11 (1977).
110. See Foreign Sovereigns Antitrust Actions, supra note 95, at 143. The

author points out that the analogy between states and foreign sovereigns is
strengthened in other ways. For example, foreign sovereigns would have
difficulty in applying their own statutory remedies. Also, they would face

formidable and expensive discovery problems if suit is brought in the
United States.
111. 434 U.S. at 318.
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antitrust violations. 112 Therefore, Evans seems to be an applicable precedent to support the conclusion that foreign govern1 13
ments be allowed to sue for treble damages.
Diplomatic Considerations
In addition to judicial precedent, diplomatic considerations
also militated in favor of the Pfizer Court's decision to allow foreign sovereigns to sue under the Clayton Act for treble damages.
The Court noted that this decision was consonant with concepts
of diplomacy decided by the Court in the past.114 Generally,
foreign nations have been permitted to bring civil claims in
United States courts in the interests of comity.115 To deny for-

eign nations this privilege would manifest a want of comity and
friendly feeling. 116 The policy of comity was so persuasive that
it had even been extended to countries towards which the
United States had shown animosity. 117 For example, even
though Cuba in the early 1960's had severed diplomatic relations
with the United States, and the United States had frozen Cuban
assets in the United States, Cuba was still permitted to sue in
United States courts."l 8 The privilege of bringing a suit in domestic courts had been denied only to those governments with
which the United States was at war or governments which have
not been recognized. 119 Thus, principles of comity seemed to
112. Velvel, supra note 50, at 21.
113. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Pfizer. Burger conceded
that the plight of domestic states and foreign sovereigns was roughly comparable when viewed solely in terms of remedies. But he would construe
Evans narrowly on the ground that denying states the treble damage rem-

edy would effectively deny surrogate protection to American citizens in
whose behalf the state acts and who were specifically meant to be protected
by the Sherman Act. Since foreign governments do not act for the benefit
of American citizens, the analysis in Evans should not be applied to foreign

sovereigns. There is no proof that Congress intended that the same benefits
running to domestic states should be applied to foreign sovereigns.
Thus while the result in Evans is a tolerable taking of certain liberties
with the literal language of the statute, the congruence of that result
with Congress' purpose can scarcely be doubted. This same logic, however, does not even remotely apply to the situation of foreign nations.
434 U.S. at 326.
Justice Powell, in his dissent, reiterated this logic saying that the deci-

sion in Evans was predicated on the benefit that would accrue to American
citizens. Since allowing foreign sovereigns to sue would not benefit American consumers, Evans should not be extended to include foreign sovereigns. Id. at 329.

114. Id. at 319.
115. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870).
116. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 165 (1870).
117. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964).
118. Id. at 409.
119. Id.
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require that foreign governments be permitted to sue for treble
damages in our courts. 120
Permitting foreign sovereigns to sue for treble damages was
121
in agreement with Congressional and Executive policies.
The Bretton Woods Agreement 122 declared that foreign nations
should take steps to eliminate unfair trade practices in international trade. 123 Allowing foreign governments to sue for treble
damages would advance this policy. 124 Furthermore, disallowing foreign sovereigns to sue could be interpreted by those and
other nations as a hostile action in derogation of treaties already
125
signed with the United States.
In addition to the possibility of alienating other nations, denying foreign sovereigns the right to sue for treble damages
would lead to anomalous results. 1 26 Some nations are organized
as corporations under their laws. 127 These nations, suing as corporations, would be permitted to bring suit. However, those nations not organized as corporations would be precluded from
suing. Thus, a situation would arise in which some nations
could sue while others could not.
A further anomaly would result under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976128 if suits by foreign governments
for treble damages were not allowed. Under this Act, foreign
states are not immune from suits regarding their commercial activities. 129 This could make a foreign nation liable for antitrust
violations committed in the United States. Unless permitted to
sue, a nation could be put in the position of being liable for antitrust violations while being denied the complementary rem130
edy.
In contrast to the above reasons, commentators have raised
the argument that since foreign sovereigns, as defendants, are
not liable for punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,131 they should not be able to sue for puni120. See Velvel, supra note 50, at 9; Foreign GovernmentAntitrust Standing, supra note 106, at 293.

121. Velvel, supra note 50, at 9.
122. 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-286k-1 (1976).

123. Id. § 286k.
124. Foreign Government Antitrust Standing,supra note 106, at 293.
125. Amicus Curiae Brief for Federal Republic of Germany at 6-8, Pfizer,
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.

128. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1977).
129. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West Supp. 1977).
130. Amicus Curiae Brief for Federal Republic of Germany at 17, Pfizer,
Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308.
131. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West Supp. 1977).
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tive damages as plaintiffs. 132 The Supreme Court, however, has
previously recognized that in antitrust legislation an entity may
sue for treble damages even if it cannot be sued for its own antitrust violations. 133 Therefore, this argument, which the
Supreme Court in Pfizer did not even mention, presents no barrier to the right of foreign sovereigns to sue in the United States.
Allowing foreign sovereigns to sue for treble damages is
consistent with the foreign policy espoused by Congress and the
Executive branch. In fact, it could improve foreign relations by
showing foreign governments that we intend to be fair to them.
For these reasons, foreign governments should be allowed to
sue for treble damages.'3
CONCLUSION

In Pfizer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
ensuring the broad scope of the antitrust laws in order to guarantee healthy competition. Despite the absence of a specific congressional intent to include foreign sovereigns as persons under
the Clayton Act, the broad scope of the law required that foreign
sovereigns be permitted to sue for treble damages.
The Supreme Court noted that the legislative and judicial
history of the antitrust laws disclosed a broad remedial purpose
132. This argument is based on the theory that to be permitted to sue for
treble damages, one must be liable under the antitrust laws for treble damages. Since foreign governments are not liable for treble damages under
the antitrust laws, they should not be permitted to sue for treble damages
under the antitrust laws. See Velvel, supra note 50, at 21.
133. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court held that an attack
on a state law as an illegal restraint of trade was an attack on state regulation and that the Sherman Act did not restrain a state's regulation of economic activities. In other words, a state may not be sued for treble
damages under the Sherman Act. But in Evans the Court decided that a
state can sue for treble damages under the Sherman Act. Using the two
cases together, the result is that a party need not be suable in order to sue.
Id. at 21-22.
134. But see Justice Powell's dissent in Pfizer. Powell noted that
whether or not a foreign sovereign should be allowed to sue was a general
policy question. Powell stated that general policy questions, especially
with respect to foreign affairs, and in the absence of explicit legislative authority, are political questions not to be decided by the judiciary. "A court,
without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the policy
considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not competent in my
opinion to resolve this question in the best interest of our country." 434 U.S.
at 331. Chief Justice Burger also argued that the policy issue was too delicate and important to be resolved by the judiciary and should be left to the
Congress and the Executive. However, these arguments are not totally
valid. When the rights of aggrieved parties require resolution, the courts
have often decided these controversies on their merits regardless of the fact
that foreign relations may be intimately connected. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AffAERS AND THE CONsTrTUTON 207-208 (1972). See also Foreign Sovereigns
Antitrust Actions, supra note 95, at 152.
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to protect parties injured by violations of these laws. This protection was not intended to be limited to United States citizens
alone. The laws provided that foreign individuals, such as corporations, could also sue if they were injured.
The Court then noted that without the ability to sue for
treble damages, foreign sovereigns would be devoid of remedies
under federal antitrust laws. Foreign sovereigns possessed none
of the alternative weapons which are available to the United
States government in dealing with antitrust violations.
Whatever means of redress foreign sovereigns had, at best they
were no more effective and possibly less effective than the
means of redress presently available to a state. The Court reasoned, therefore, that the expansive remedial intent of the law
would be best served by permitting foreign sovereigns to sue for
treble damages.
Permitting foreign sovereigns to sue provides protection to
American consumers by ensuring that victims of antitrust violations can obtain redress and by maximizing the deterrent effect
of the antitrust laws. When foreign nations enter into commercial markets as purchasers, they can also be victims of anticompetitive practices. In the absence of other remedies, they
should be permitted to sue for treble damages. Furthermore, allowing foreign sovereigns to sue is consistent with diplomatic
and foreign policy considerations by displaying comity to foreign nations. These factors combine to form a strong basis for
the Court's decision.
After the decision was first announced by the Supreme
Court, there were immediate signs of Congressional disapproval. In the Senate an amendment was added to Senate Bill
1874 which would preclude foreign sovereigns from suing under
the Clayton Act unless certain conditions were met, and if these
conditions were met, foreign sovereigns would still be limited to
actual damages. 135 A similar bill was introduced in the House
135. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

The amendment provides:

Sec. 5. Section 4 of the Clayton Act is amended by adding at the end of
that section the following new language:
Provided, however, that suits under this section brought by foreign sovereign governments, departments or agencies thereof, shall be limited
to actual damages; and, provided further, that no foreign sovereign may
maintain an action in any court of the United States under the authority of this section unless the Attorney General of the United States,
within 120 days after the commencement of the action, has certified to
the relevant court or a relevant court otherwise finds that(1) the United States is entitled to sue in its own name and on its own
behalf on a civil claim in the courts of such foreign sovereign; and
(2) such foreign sovereign by its laws prohibits restrictive trade practices.
The amendment made by this section shall apply to any action which is

206

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:187
136

of Representatives.
At the time of this writing, both bills are in committee in
each chamber of Congress. The chances for passage are uncertain. The reason for uncertainty is that although there seems to
be general opposition in Congress to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Pfizer, there is also concern that the bills are being acted
upon too quickly to explore adequately the ramifications of the
bill. 137 Suggestions have been made to hold hearings on the bill
but these were defeated, 138 and at this time, it appears that the
bills will be voted upon without a full exploration of the ramifications.
As the bills progressed through their respective houses, the
original reaction seems to have been replaced by more thoughtful analyses of the Court's decision and the ramifications of
overruling it. For example, the House International Relations
Committee, which disagreed with the bill, has expressed con139
cern over the foreign policy implications.
A Congressional overruling of Pfizer would be a retreat from
the policy of broadly interpreting antitrust laws in order to maximize their effectiveness. This result would stem from a protectionist attitude that does not pertain to today's economic reality
of interconnected economies.
If Congress does not disturb the holding in Pfizer, it will be
assenting to the broad reach that the antitrust laws were intended to have. It will also be recognizing the various foreign
policy considerations that prompted the Pfizer decision. More
importantly, it will reaffirm this country's commitment to the
free enterprise system, and it will demonstrate to the Supreme
Court that the legislative branch wishes the antitrust laws to be
as effective as possible.
Gary M. Shaw

pending on the date of enactment of this act or which is commenced on or
after such date of enactment.
136. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
137. See [1978] 858 ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Al.
138. See [1978] 869 ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), A12; [1978]
870 ANTTRuST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), A1-2.
139. [1978] 876 ANTUST AND TRADE REG. REP.(BNA), A15.

